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The Case for Reforming the Program’s Spouse Benefits
While “Saving Social Security”*
Peter W. Martin**
Introduction
In 2011 nearly $113 billion in Social Security payments, 15.6% of total benefit payments
for the year, were distributed to spouses, former spouses, and surviving spouses solely or
principally on the basis of a present or past marital relationship. The year before the
percentage was slightly higher, the amount, slightly lower. 1 No additional payroll tax was
levied on the employee-spouse to cover these benefits nor did they constitute a shift in the
payout pattern between spouses of a set amount of benefits. These were quite simply
additional payments based on marriage.
Spouse benefits, which were appended to Social Security in 1939 and dramatically
liberalized since, represent a discrete and increasingly problematic feature of the program.
At a time when analysts and politicians of nearly all persuasions agree that the long-term
fiscal health of Social Security calls for legislative revision, one might expect serious
proposals for change in the provisions that direct benefits to wives (and husbands),
widows (and widowers), but so far that has not occurred. No doubt, that is because any
prospective reduction in spouse benefits that promised to contribute to Social Security’s
long-term fiscal balance would, standing alone, quite properly be perceived as having a
negative impact on women. Costly, outdated, and inequitable, these marriage-based
benefits may be, but unless supplanted by some less arbitrary way to connect Social
Security to families and alternative measures to assure adequate retirement income for
women they cannot be got rid of. On the other hand, any package of Social Security
reforms that fails to rethink and revise the spouse-benefit provisions will miss a rare
opportunity to improve the fairness and adequacy of the program’s benefits for women
and run the risk of disadvantaging them as a group.
A few basic facts about the Social Security benefit structure should illuminate why this is
so. Two separate routes to Social Security entitlement exist. The first is through one’s
own prior covered employment; the second, through the prior covered work of a family
member, most commonly a spouse or former spouse. Primary benefits, based on one’s
own work, become available upon retirement (as measured by advanced age and, for a
slightly younger group, age and low earnings) or earlier in the event of total disability.
Secondary benefits, arising from another’s work, are paid to “dependents” or “dependent
survivors” of covered workers. Those eligible include several categories of children and
adults. Among adult dependents, spouses and former spouses are by far the most
numerous.
The Social Security Act currently provides secondary benefits to the wives or widows of
covered workers who retire, become disabled, or die. To qualify, a woman must have
been married to the worker for a short period and must be old (sixty-two, dropping to
sixty in the case of a widow, fifty in the case of a disabled widow) or caring for children
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under sixteen. If a wife’s or widow’s primary retired-worker or disability benefits equal
or exceed her secondary benefit entitlement, she receives only the primary benefits.
However, if her secondary benefit amount is greater she receives both her primary benefit
and enough of the secondary benefit to bring the total up to its level.
Men can also qualify for benefits based solely on their status as husband or widower of a
worker; but spouse benefits go overwhelmingly to women. Table 1 illustrates the relative
importance of primary and secondary benefits to men and women. Less than one percent
of adult male beneficiaries receive secondary benefits, while the percentage for all adult
female beneficiaries is over twenty-two. 2 Among females sixty-two and older, it is
higher still.3 Average monthly payments to male retired workers are substantially higher
than those to female retired workers, spouses of male retired workers, or widows.
Because of this disparity well over a third of the women receiving retired-worker benefits
also receive secondary benefits. The number of men with “dual entitlement” is
miniscule.4
Table 1
Adult Social Security Beneficiaries by Sex and Benefit Type
December 2010
Men
N

Women
$

N

$

Primary:
Retired Workers

17,582,235

1,323.10

19,542,879

1,022.90

4,309,685

1,191.10

3,894,266

931.30

Disabled Workers
Total

21,891,920

23,437,145

Secondary:
Spouses of Retired Workers
--without childrena
b

--with children

56,912

365.90

2,216,430

586.90

92

458.20

43,102

509.10

4,682

267.60

81,487

344.80

1,930

178.90

72,201

224.80

65,538

977.90

3,975,422

1,136.40

12,220

498.70

232,733

690.90

11,891

729.90

146,170

858.60

Spouses of Disabled Workers
--without childrena
b

--with children

Surviving Spouses
--without childrena (nondisabled)
a

--without children (disabled)
b

--with children
Total

153,265

6,767,545

N = Number receiving benefits.
$ = Average monthly benefit.
a
Spouses eligible by virtue of age.
b
Younger spouses eligible because of eligible children.
Source: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2011, Tables 5.A1.1, 5.A1.3,
5.A1.5, 5.A1.6, 5.A1.7.
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Social Security benefits of both types, primary and secondary, hold greater
importance for women than men.
•

For women, age sixty-five and older, Social Security comprises over 60% of
total income. For men, the comparable figure is 55%. 5 And among those
sixty-five and older receiving Social Security benefits, for a significantly larger
fraction of women than men, it constitutes 90% or more of family income. 6

•

Elderly women are less likely than elderly men to have significant income
from other pensions in addition to Social Security. The percentage of women
with pensions of any kind is lower, and their median pension amounts, much
lower than men. 7

•

Since women, on average, live longer than men, 8 they represent a majority of
Social Security recipients sixty-five and older and a significantly higher
percentage of the oldest beneficiaries. 9 Because of their greater longevity,
women are also more likely than men to outlive a spouse and any retirement
savings. 10

It would be comforting to suppose that changes in the labor market and more equal
allocation of work within the family home will, before long, lead to a withering away
of supplemental benefits for wives, former wives, and widows. If that occurs, it will
not be any time soon. A 1998 interagency working group concluded that a significant
percentage of women Social Security beneficiaries would continue to receive spouse
benefits as far out as 2060, average retired-worker benefits for women would remain
well below those for men in 2050, and the life expectancy differential at age sixty-five
would persist. 11 A study published in 2012 projected that for the cohort born from 1966
through 1975 (“GenXers”) “about one fourth of GenX wives and two-thirds of GenX
widows .. [would] receive auxiliary benefits at retirement.” 12 As the program trustees
discharge their annual duty to project benefits and income under current law, they
continue to forecast spouse benefits enduring past 2090. 13 Since the amount of an
individual’s Social Security primary benefit is based on an earnings record stretching
back as many as thirty-five years, even when the day arrives that women and men are
paid equally and divide family care responsibilities down the middle, it will still take
a long time thereafter for Social Security payments to reflect that altered reality.
This article focuses on the law that governs entitlement to and the amount of spouse
benefits, exploring why a program addition that seemed so attractive in 1939 has
become a source of disturbing arbitrariness and inequity and how a measure
specifically designed to improve retirement income for women has become less and
less effective. The deficiencies of the present system are illuminated through
comparison with alternative methods of connecting a family’s covered earnings with
later benefits modeled on state marital property regimes and the law’s treatment of
other forms of spousal retirement income. Although this study does not explore the
full range of alternative approaches to improving Social Security benefits for women
nor the implications for women of the many Social Security restructuring proposals
aimed at establishing fiscal sustainability, it does attempt to connect reform of this
one program element to a number of those options.
In terms of the issues explored here the exclusion of same-sex marriages from Social
3

Security’s spouse benefits by the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), currently
in the spotlight, 14 is at most a side note. Should DOMA be struck down or repealed,
spouse benefits will continue to be fundamentally inequitable. Removal of this
barrier, erected by Congress in 1996, will simply permit a few more spouses, male
and female, to claim marriage-based benefits under a seriously flawed system.

I. Spouse Benefits as Originally Conceived
As first enacted Social Security did not include spouse benefits. The Social Security
Act of 1935 tied benefit entitlement rather closely to contribution; the program paid
benefits only to retired workers (male or female) or, upon death, to the worker’s
estate. 15 In 1939, however, acting on the recommendation of the Social Security
Board, 16 Congress relaxed the benefit-contribution relationship in several ways,
including the addition of secondary benefits. 17 The amendments of that year
established “supplemental payments” to aged wives of retired workers to “take
account of [the] greater presumptive need of the married couple without requiring
investigation of individual need.” 18 On similar “welfare” grounds, the amendments
substituted survivor benefits to aged widows and children for lump-sum payments to
the worker’s estate. 19
An acute short-term economic and political problem – the extremely low payout and
coverage of Social Security during its infancy – motivated enactment of these
measures. They were thought to possess limited long-range importance: “Since in
the course of time many women will have developed substantial benefit rights based
upon their own past earnings, the cost of providing the supplement for dependent
wives [and widows should] gradually decline, and eventually the additional cost
[should] be reduced to a relatively small amount.” 20 The inequities thus created –
single workers and two-worker couples contributed no less and sometimes more than
one-worker couples, yet reaped no advantage from the new classes of benefits –
seemed a small matter at a time when the Social Security tax was only 1% of the first
$3,000 of annual wages. 21
Anticipating objections to secondary benefits on the ground that “presumptive need”
should not shape entitlement, the Social Security Board argued that the program
already reflected a concern for relative need. 22 The Board suggested that providing
new dependent and survivor benefits and revising the retired-worker benefit formula
did not violate the contributory or “insurance” character of the system so long as a
“reasonable relationship . . . between benefits payable and past earnings” was
maintained. 23 The Board found no offense to this “reasonable relationship” test in the
additional wife benefits because everyone, married or single, would, for the
immediate future, receive more than they had contributed. 24 The 1939 amendments
also set a maximum on the total monthly benefits payable on a particular worker’s
account. That ceiling, today termed the “family maximum,” limited the degree of
unfairness to unmarried contributors resulting from the new secondary benefits. 25
The original terms governing wife and widow benefits left little doubt that Congress
intended them to meet a presumed loss of income caused by the retirement or death of
a husband rather than as an expression of the notion that a wife had contributed to or
had a stake in her husband’s earnings. Eligibility hinged on marriage at the time of
4

the worker’s retirement or death, not during the period in which he built up his Social
Security wage account. 26 To qualify in accordance with the presumptive need
rationale, a woman had to show she was living with her husband or at least financially
dependent on him. 27 Regardless of her age, a wife could receive spouse benefits only
when her husband was old enough to receive retired-worker benefits and had, in fact,
retired and applied. 28 Divorce ended a wife’s entitlement; remarriage ended a
widow’s. 29 Finally, each dollar of retired-worker benefits a woman was eligible to
receive on her own account displaced a dollar of these need-premised spouse
benefits. 30
On the other hand, at the time it seemed obvious that most eligible wives and widows
would have been married to the covered worker during the period in which he earned
his primary benefits. 31 The new secondary benefits reflected, ever so slightly, a
notion of shared contribution. Rather than adding a single uniform payment for
dependent wives and surviving widows (which would have typified a need-oriented or
“welfare” approach), the benefit formula set individual amounts proportionate to the
retired-worker benefits a woman’s husband could claim at sixty-five. A dependent
wife was entitled to 50% of her husband’s benefits; a widow, 75%. 32 Despite
frequent references then, as now, to “the couple’s benefit” or to “a supplement for
married men,” the secondary benefits established in 1939 truly belonged to the
eligible spouse. The male retired worker received his benefit; his eligible wife
received her own. 33 However, the number of points at which a wife’s eligibility
rested on the covered worker’s status – including matters largely within his control –
significantly qualified this independence.
During their first decade, wife and widow benefits proved to be expedient needfocused or antipoverty measures. Although the male-female ratio was then more
closely balanced than at present, even during the 1940s elderly women outnumbered
elderly men. 34 Very few older women had enough recent employment (post-1936) to
qualify for Social Security retired-worker benefits. 35 Poverty was so prevalent among
the elderly at the time that any program paying benefits to those sixty-five and over
could reasonably have been called an antipoverty measure; 36 and poverty was most
pervasive among elderly women, 37 particularly widows. 38
Under these circumstances, paying secondary benefits to wives and widows of Social
Security contributors seemed a pragmatic way to provide limited amounts of monthly
income to a class of needy people. In 1942 only 13,000 women qualified for retiredworker benefits, compared to 87,000 men. 39 Wife benefits permitted an additional
33,000 elderly women to qualify for payments; 15,000 elderly widows collected on
the accounts of their deceased husbands, and 32,000 widows under sixty-five were
eligible because of young children in their care. 40 Since payments were small, 41 the
few cases where presumed need did not in fact exist represented neither serious fiscal
waste nor a major windfall to the recipient.
Even with the new benefits, Social Security reached less than 20% of the nation’s
elderly by the end of the forties. Without benefits for dependent and surviving
spouses, the program’s payments in 1949 would have diminished by nearly one
quarter and the number of beneficiaries by an even larger fraction. 42
5

II. Subsequent Revisions That Produced a Very Different System
A. Liberalized Eligibility, More Generous Amounts (for Women)
Contrary to congressional expectations on enactment, spouse benefits have remained
significant even as more and more women have become eligible for retired-worker
benefits on their own account. In large part that is the result of subsequent changes to
their terms. Under the 1939 formula, a woman retiring at age sixty-five in 1949 had only
to have earned average monthly wages of $37 for twelve years to receive benefits on her
own account, so long as she was married to the average male beneficiary retiring the
same year.43 The average monthly wages of a female worker in manufacturing in 1939
were almost twice that amount. The gradual disappearance of spouse benefits was thus a
reasonable prediction assuming stable wage levels and an unchanging benefit formula.44
Events soon upset both those underlying assumptions. From 1940 on, wages and prices
rose steadily and, beginning in 1950, Congress responded with periodic revisions of the
benefit formula.45 Each revision increased retired-worker benefits and produced
proportionate increases for secondary-benefit recipients. The relationship that evolved
between the two types of benefits differed substantially from that contained in the 1939
legislation. Furthermore, the same motivations that led Congress to create dependent and
survivor benefits in 1939, later induced it, time and again, to liberalize the terms on which
they were awarded.
In 1950 Congress granted wife benefits to younger wives caring for eligible children of
retired workers, and extended survivor benefits to divorced former wives caring for
children of deceased workers.46 A 1956 amendment reduced from sixty-five to sixty-two
the age at which women could collect wife or widow benefits (without having young
children in their care), and also retired-worker benefits.47 For widows, a 1965
amendment reduced the age to sixty;48 one two years later dropped it to fifty for totally
disabled widows.49
Congress dropped the “living with” requirement for both wives and widows in 1957,
leaving marital status the sole test of “dependency” and also slightly clarified the marital
status definition.50 Three years later, Congress again liberalized the wife- and widowbenefit provisions, reducing the durational requirement a wife had to meet from three
years to one51 and adding a new purely federal test of marital status that qualified those
who, although not legally married under state law, had gone through a marriage
ceremony in good faith.52
In 1958, two years after adding disability benefits to Social Security, Congress extended
dependent benefits to spouses and children of disabled workers on the same terms as it
had to dependents of retired workers.53
The 1939 amendments pegged wife benefits at 50% of the worker’s primary insurance
amount and aged-widow benefits at 75%. 54 In 1961, the latter figure was increased to
82.5% and in 1972, to 100%. 55
The equivalent of wife and widow benefits were extended to divorced women in 1965 on
condition that their marriages had lasted twenty years and that they continued to be
financially dependent on their former spouses.56 Congress removed the actual6

dependency requirement in 1972,57 and reduced the durational requirement to ten years
in 1977.58 When it added benefits for divorced spouses Congress placed them outside
the family maximum.59 The 1990 Social Security Act amendments did the same for a
“legal spouse” in cases where there is also another person “deemed” a spouse under the
Act. 60 The linkage between divorced spouse benefits and the retired-worker benefits to
which they related was loosened in 1983.61 No longer did an individual who had been
divorced at least two years have to wait for the former spouse’s application for retiredworker benefits or worry about benefits being reduced due to the former spouse’s
continuing earnings.
These numerous amendments, combined with the growth in Social Security coverage,
made it increasingly easy for women to qualify for spouse benefits. In addition, the
dramatic improvement in basic benefits and in the widow’s entitlement as a percentage of
the primary insurance amount substantially raised the value of such secondary benefits.
Although more women do, indeed, qualify for retirement benefits, under the present
retired-worker formula women’s wage and work patterns often yield benefit amounts
below wife or widow entitlements. Nearly 40% of the women currently receiving retiredworker benefits also receive secondary spouse benefits, compared to 15% at the end of
1966 and less than 10% at the end of 1956. 62
Figure 1 63

Behind the many spouse-benefit amendments lay no clear scheme or consistent rationale.
Indeed, Congress’s ad hoc approach to modifying these provisions virtually guaranteed
that “[no] particular amendment fits with mathematical nicety into a carefully conceived
overall plan for payment of benefits.”64 Nonetheless, taken together the amendments
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reflect two important features of the spouse-benefit approach. First, because entitlement
to such benefits stems from a “presumed need” rather than a contribution rationale,
Congress has frequently succumbed to the argument that a particular group of women
(and occasionally men) excluded by existing eligibility rules should be included. The
case for their inclusion is simply that they are at least as deserving as many of those
already receiving benefits. Because the line between eligible and ineligible is
demonstrably arbitrary, it has proven, over time, to be particularly unstable.
Second, many of the post-1939 amendments seemed to respond to the entanglement of
spouse benefits in hard-to-manage factual and legal questions. The dependent and
dependent-survivor benefits added in 1939 proved complicated to administer. Eligibility
and benefit calculations for retired workers primarily required proof of age and use of
routinely collected wage records. In contrast, determining eligibility for wife or widow
benefits required ascertaining the validity of marriages and divorces under state law and
scrutinizing living and support arrangements. As a consequence, these secondary
benefits accounted for a significant portion of Social Security administrative appeals and
litigation65 before Congress injected the far more troublesome issue of “disability” into
the system in 1956.66 Removal of the “living with” test for wives and widows in 1957
and the support test for divorced wives in 1972 eliminated difficult legal and factual
issues.67 The 1960 addition of a liberal federal definition of “spouse” also simplified
marital status determination in some cases.68
While any conclusion about what the many spouse-benefit amendments demonstrate is
debatable; their cumulative effect is clear: they assured that spouse benefits would not
“wither away” and increased the inherent arbitrariness of this program element.

B. Gender Neutrality
Congress provided limited secondary benefits to aged husbands and widowers as early as
1950.69 Those carried a test of “actual dependency” on the wage earner more stringent
than any applied to wives or widows. 70 That test remained after the 1957 amendments
eliminated the requirement that wives or widows either be living with or financially
supported by their husbands.71 It remained after 1972, when Congress deleted the
requirement that divorced women be financially dependent on their retired or deceased
former husbands.72 Thus, by 1975, women received spouse benefits solely on the basis of
their marital status at benefit time; men did not. In addition, certain spouse benefits –
principally benefits for divorced women and for young widows caring for children of
deceased wage earners (mother benefits) – remained wholly unavailable to men.
In 1975, the Supreme Court began to chip away at this gender-differentiated structure in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,73 holding that Social Security had to furnish young widowers
with benefits comparable to mother benefits. Two years later, the Court substantially
completed the job in Califano v. Goldfarb,74 Califano v. Silbowitz, 75 and Califano v.
Jablon,76 ruling that Social Security must grant elderly widowers and husbands spouse
benefits on the same terms it does to widows and wives.77 Congress amended the Social
Security Act to codify those decisions and remove most other gender-based distinctions in
1983.78
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C. Preventing a Windfall to Husbands (and Wives) Whose Careers
Fell outside Social Security
The extension of secondary benefits to men on the same terms as they were available
to women highlighted a growing problem with that scheme. 79 The attenuated chain of
presumption it embodied – a presumption of need resting upon a presumption of
financial dependency on the covered spouse’s earnings which in turn rested upon
marital status alone – too often failed to conform to the facts. And the payment of
benefits to those for whom the presumptions of need and dependency were invalid
could no longer be dismissed, as it had been in 1939, as involving neither significant
fiscal cost nor major windfall to the recipient. 80
Two features of the spouse-benefit provisions helped contain the problem. First,
greatly expanded Social Security coverage made it increasingly likely that a spouse’s
work outside the home would be reflected in a Social Security wage record. Spouses
with sufficient wage records to support retired-worker benefits received those
benefits, which then offset spouse benefits dollar for dollar. 81 Second, the retirement
test, applicable to both retired-worker and spouse benefits, blocked benefits to those
who were non-needy because of their own or their spouses’ continuing earnings, at
least prior to age seventy-two. 82
Nonetheless, spouses who had never been financially dependent on a covered worker
could receive substantial spouse benefits. That was, of course, true of some wives
and widows before Goldfarb. But the husband and widower benefit cases threatened
the system with a wave of new benefit claims from “nondependent” men who lacked
Social Security retirement coverage of their own, not because of insubstantial
employment, but because their employment had not been covered by Social Security
but instead by some other public pension scheme. (Federal employees and many state
and local government workers were at the time not yet covered by Social Security.) 83
All three men seeking spouse benefits in the cases decided by the Supreme Court in
March 1977 were retired federal employees on pension. 84
In response to Goldfarb, the administration proposed a new test of actual dependency
for all spouse benefits. That test would have qualified only people who earned less
than their spouses during the three-year period immediately preceding the event
triggering eligibility – retirement, death, or disability. 85 Opponents argued that the
proposal threatened to exclude many deserving women. They noted that a three-year
period of relative earnings would often fail to reflect accurately the long-term
economic relationship of a marriage, especially since the critical period under the test
was likely to fall between ages fifty-five and sixty-five. 86
Congress substituted a narrower and less controversial provision. It offset pensions
from uncovered public employment against secondary benefits much in the way the
system had always offset retired-worker benefits. The provision, which did not extend
to spouse benefits already applied for, created a reduction in spouse benefits equal to
“the amount of any monthly periodic benefit payable … for such month which is
based upon [his or] her earnings while in the service of the Federal government or any
State (or political subdivision thereof. . .) if, on the last day [he or] she was employed
by such entity, such service [was not covered by Social Security]. 87
9

Congress was primarily concerned with preventing a post-Goldfarb flow of spouse
benefits to “non-needy” male spouses and hesitant to upset the expectations of women
facing imminent retirement. For this reason, the amendment deferred the new offset’s
effective date for those who met the requirements of the spouse-benefit provisions as
they were “in effect and being administered in January 1977” – in other words, prior
to Goldfarb, Silbowitz, and Jablon. 88 Once the phase-in period passed, spouse
benefits were limited to people without comparable publicly provided retirement
benefits, whether in the form of retired-worker benefits from work covered by Social
Security or pension benefits from public employment. 89

III. Growing Unfairness Vis-à-vis Contributors for Whom Spouse
Benefits Have Little or No Value
A. The Retreat from Marriage, Increased Divorce, the Prevalence of
Two-Earner Marriages
Although a constructive step, blocking the flow of benefits to the largest visible group of
otherwise eligible “non-needy” retirees left untouched the core inequity of the spousebenefit system. For a growing fraction of those who pay the Social Security tax these
benefits hold no value, direct or indirect. Viewed from that “contributor’s” perspective
such secondary benefits seem quite unfair, and unfair to a far greater degree than when
they were first added to Social Security.
The national norm in 1939, the group favored by spouse benefits grows less typical each
year, while those who contribute but receive no return in this form steadily increase in
number. The former are those in qualifying marriages in which one spouse has been the
family’s primary earner and possesses a full Social Security earnings record while the
other has consistently had low or no covered earnings. Those covered by Social Security
for whom spouse benefits hold little or no value include the never married, those once
married but divorced after fewer than ten years, and those married to individuals with very
similar earnings histories. The difference in Social Security’s implicit rate of return on
contribution for these polar groups is huge. The return to a one-earner couple with high
earnings is more than double that to an otherwise identical single worker or two-earner
couple; at lower income levels the discrepancy is pronounced although less extreme. 90
Since 1970 U.S. age-adjusted marriage rates have been in steady decline. 91 In the cohort
of women closely approaching the age of Social Security eligibility (namely, those in their
fifties), 9% have never married. The figure is 13% among women in their forties, over
20% among those in their thirties. This “retreat from marriage” is particularly pronounced
among black women for whom the never married figures for the same three cohorts are
22%, 31%, and 47%. 92 It also is more pronounced among those with lower incomes and
less education. 93
For a prior marriage ending in divorce to be a source of spouse benefits, it must have
lasted at least ten years. Although the reduction of the durational threshold from twenty
years dramatically expanded the eligible group, the percentage of divorced women with
fewer than ten years in any past marriage is both significant and growing, having more
than doubled among fifty-year-olds between 1990 and 2009. In 2009, the figure for all
women in their fifties was 7%, for black women it was 12%. 94 Among all living adults
10

whose first marriages ended in divorce the median duration of those ended marriages was
eight years. 95 Among women whose second marriages ended in divorce it was no
longer. 96
Because primary benefits offset secondary benefits, spouse benefits have their greatest
value for couples in which one spouse has a continuous history of covered earnings and
the other has none. They have no value for couples in which the covered earnings of
husband and wife are the same. Today, well over half of U.S. married couples report
earnings from both spouses. 97 Remove couples above the age of Social Security
eligibility and the percentage is higher still. 98
In sum, benefits that can be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, the case with an
individual without a meaningful earnings record of her own, married to (or divorced after
ten years from) a high earnings worker, are subsidized by a growing fraction of the
working population – the unmarried and married couples with similar earnings records.
Disproportionately low income individuals and families, blacks, and Hispanics are in that
subsidizing fraction. 99

B. Spouse Benefits No Longer Limited to a Single Spouse
The 1939 amendments limited the total of dependent benefits that could be paid on the
account of any contributing worker. 100 In addition, the reference to state law for the
marital status determination assured that in most states there could be but one eligible
spouse. Before Congress repealed it in 1957, the “living with” requirement combined
with the “legal spouse” requirement virtually assured a limit of one spouse per worker.
The 1965 addition of divorced wives constituted a complete break with that constraint,
introducing a significant possibility of at least two spouses qualifying on a single worker’s
account. At the same time the family maximum was removed as a limitation. Benefits
paid to a divorced spouse are not subject to the worker’s family maximum nor do they
count against the maximum when it is applied to other benefits paid on the worker’s
account. 101 In 1977, Congress reduced the duration-of-marriage test for divorced wives to
ten years, thereby substantially increasing the pool of eligible individuals and the extent to
which divorced-wife benefits can undermine the family maximum. 102 Theoretically, a
single worker’s account can now give rise to benefit claims from multiple divorced wives
which when combined with those of diverse children and a current wife will far exceed
the maximum. (In 2009 over a quarter of the men in their fifties had been married at least
twice.) 103 Since 1990 it has been possible for there also to be a wife or widow eligible by
virtue of an undissolved “deemed valid” marriage whose benefits will be unconstrained by
the maximum’s limit. 104 (Under an amendment Congress passed that year, a state law
spouse and a spouse qualifying under the federal “deemed valid” marriage test can both
receive benefits, with the state-law spouse receiving benefits outside the family
maximum.) 105

C. Unintended Consequences: Clever Claiming Strategies (for Those
Who Can Afford Them)
Even though spouse benefits and retired-worker benefits interact, they represent distinct
11

entitlements with different adjustments for the age at which benefits are begun. For a
couple with the health and financial flexibility to decide when each will claim Social
Security this opens up some startling possibilities. That is because after an individual has
passed his or her “full retirement age” (sixty-six for those now in their sixties) applications
for retirement worker and spouse benefits can be filed separately. 106 A high earning
spouse can file for spouse benefits on a younger lower earning spouse’s account, drawing
unreduced secondary benefits for several years. All the while the older spouse will be
accumulating delayed retirement credits that will increase his or her retirement benefit
when ultimately claimed as well as any surviving spouse benefit based on it. 107
Similarly, a widow or widower can claim a retired-worker benefit while holding off filing
for surviving spouse benefits until full retirement age (at which point no further
adjustment in that benefit’s monthly amount will occur) or reverse the order, delaying
retired-worker benefits until seventy to take advantage of the delayed retirement credit
which operates only on the primary benefit. Which is the better strategy will depend on
the relative earnings levels of the deceased worker and the survivor. 108
Such options are, of course, available only to those who have sufficient resources to
choose when to commence their Social Security benefits and access to sophisticated
retirement planning advice. 109

IV. Who Is an Eligible Spouse – Arbitrary Distinctions, Troubling
Incentives
Seeming arbitrariness also pervades the provisions that establish which women (and men)
have sufficient connection to a covered former worker to qualify for spouse benefits and
set the benefit amount. The system incorporates no coherent rationale. A reasonable
presumption of need, occasioned by the cessation of earnings on which the individual was
dependent, no longer fits the statutory pattern. Many categories of spouses are eligible
despite a lack of dependence on the insured’s earnings at retirement, disability, or death.
On the other hand, constructive or shared contribution based on periods of work within the
home, invoked from time to time to justify spouse benefits, finds no consistent expression
in the eligibility rules. A marriage taking place after the accumulation of all or nearly all
of the earnings on which benefits will be based can, in a year or less, give rise to spouse
benefit eligibility providing payments no different than those available to a spouse in a
long-term marriage who sacrificed personal earnings to work within the home. 110 In
short, whether spouse benefits are viewed from the vantage point of those whose earnings
are covered, taxed, and counted toward future benefits or from that of potential recipients
their allocation is extraordinarily difficult to justify.

A. Nothing for the Nine-Year, Eleven-Month Ex-Spouse, Full Benefits
Immediately after Passing the Ten-Year Mark
The extension of benefits to former spouses, despite their lack of the requisite marital
status or actual financial dependency at benefit time, represented an implicit but marked
shift in justification for spouse benefits. Participation in a marriage, presumably as
parent/homemaker, during a period in which the covered worker built up part of a wage
record necessarily replaced “presumed” need arising from the interruption of the working
spouse’s earnings.
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While more than one individual can qualify for spouse or divorced spouse benefits on a
single earnings record, for any one claimant the stakes are “all or nothing.” The
individual is either eligible or not. A marriage finalized nine months before a worker’s
death will qualify the surviving spouse for full widow or widower benefits; one day short
and the claim fails. The same discontinuity adheres to divorce. A former spouse whose
divorce has become final only days prior to the ten-year mark is ineligible, 111 while one
who barely passes that threshold receives the same share of spouse benefits as an
individual who divorced after thirty or forty years of marriage. In no case do the type of
factors that divorce courts consider in dividing other marital assets, including pensions,
public and private, affect eligibility for or the amount of a Social Security divorced spouse
benefits.

B. An Incentive to Divorce
The fact that benefits paid a qualifying divorced spouse are not limited by the family
maximum while those paid a still-married though long separated spouse are, can provide a
powerful incentive to divorce once a marriage has passed the ten-year mark. Eligible
children may provide the catalyst. Indeed, a stably married one-earner couple with one or
more children eligible for secondary benefits can increase the family’s total benefits if
they divorce but remain together. If those children are adults, living independently but
still eligible on their parent’s account because of disability, this result seems particularly
perverse. Divorce carries another Social Security advantage over remaining married,
again assuming a marriage of adequate duration. A spouse, otherwise eligible for
secondary benefits, cannot obtain them until the higher-earning spouse has begun Social
Security retired-worker benefits or died. Furthermore, even after the higher-earning
spouse has applied, continued earnings on his part can cause a reduction in benefits for a
still-married spouse. In both respects divorce severs the link to what the spouse with the
underlying earnings record has done or not done. 112

C. State Law Distinctions, Major Federal Benefit Consequences
While Social Security disregards state law when allocating earnings between spouses, its
determinations of marital status, on which spouse benefits rest, depend (DOMA aside)
largely on the law of the state in which the earner resides (or did reside at the time of
death). The question framed by the Act is: Would the courts of that state find the couple
to be validly married? There are numerous points of law governing marriage and divorce
on which the fifty states differ. For example, a few states recognize common law
marriages. Most do not. And some, while not permitting couples to enter into common
law marriages within the state, will recognize such marriages if contracted elsewhere. As
a consequence, entitlement to valuable benefits in this federal program can depend on
where a putative married couple lived and traveled over the course of their time
together. 113 Similarly, in cases where a divorced spouse apparently falls short of the 10year duration requirement, but argues that the divorce proceedings were invalid because of
a lack of personal jurisdiction, the Social Security Administration must determine whether
the courts of the state in which the earnings record holder resides would find the divorce
to be void, leaving the marriage still in effect. 114
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D. Remarriage
Originally, since they rested on the interruption of earnings on which the system presumed
the individual to have been dependent, benefits for surviving spouses terminated upon
remarriage. 115 Remarriage, so the logic went, supplanted the need for benefits with a new
dependent relationship. Consistent with that rationale, the 1958 Social Security Act
Amendments created a complex set of exceptions to avoid terminating dependent or
survivor benefits when two secondary beneficiaries marry one another – the case, for
example, of a person collecting widow benefits marrying a widower benefits recipient. 116
That exception, however, did not significantly ameliorate the most troublesome feature of
the remarriage provision – the financial loss it attached to the marriage of a retired male
worker and a widow collecting benefits on the account of a deceased husband. This
potential loss reportedly caused many elderly couples to forego marriage. 117 Concern
over the perceived inequity of treating elderly married couples less favorably than those
cohabiting without marriage and the resulting discouragement of remarriage among
seniors put pressure on Congress to remove or reduce the remarriage penalty.
A major problem of equity, however, lay on the other side. Without loss or adjustment of
widow benefits upon remarriage, two couples, otherwise identical, could receive quite
different benefits. The first, a retired-worker husband and his dependent wife, would
receive one and one-half times his primary insurance amount. The second, a retiredworker husband and his wife, the widow of another (identical) worker, would receive
more (two full primary insurance amounts under the current widow-benefit percentage).
Concern over the remarriage disincentive led Congress, in 1965, to permit remarriage
from sixty on for widows (sixty-two for widowers) with only a 50% reduction in benefits
(based on the original spouse’s primary insurance amount) rather than their complete
loss. 118 In 1977, Congress completely removed the remarriage penalty for this group. 119
This resolution inescapably produced a benefit structure in which widow/retired-worker
and widower/retired-worker married couples receive “more than other couples would get
where the husbands [or wives] had an identical record of covered earnings.” 120 It also
draws an important line at age sixty that may be inconspicuous to those contemplating
remarriage at an earlier age and, in some cases, a strong marriage disincentive to those
aware of it.

E. The Death of an Ex-Spouse
While a surviving divorced spouse can, like a widow or widower, safely remarry upon
reaching sixty, anyone drawing benefits on the account of a living ex-spouse cannot.
Until the ex-spouse dies, remarriage at any age blocks eligibility for secondary benefits.
The death of the ex-spouse also doubles the divorced spouse benefit amount. Unlike other
ties between divorced spouse benefits and the primary benefit holder that have been
severed these remain. The death of an individual with whom the divorced spouse may
have well have ended all legal and economic ties long ago can have a major effect on
benefits as it converts the divorced spouse (eligible for 50% of the worker’s primary
insurance amount so long as she not remarry) into a surviving divorced spouse (eligible
for 100% of the primary insurance amount and free to remarry upon attaining age sixty) or
in the case of a younger person caring for a child who is eligible for survivor’s benefits
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(mother or father benefits equal to 75% of the primary insurance amount) without regard
to age.
Arbitrary consequences like these are simply unavoidable; they inhere in this system of
benefits tied neither to actual financial dependency or need nor to direct or derivative
contribution.

V. Realigning Social Security’s Treatment of Marriage with State
Marital Property Law: The Idea of Earnings Sharing
A. Equitable Division of Marital Property
Since Social Security spouse benefits were first established and later extended to divorced
former husbands and wives, state domestic relations law and most segments of federal
employee benefit law have moved to the view that both parties to a marriage have a claim
upon each other’s earnings and retirement income. In ten states this is reflected in
comprehensive community property regimes. 121 As a leading treatise on community
property explains the core idea:
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the
foundation of this concept is the principle that all wealth accumulated by the joint
efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the law
being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a
community of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her
industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property
after its dissolution. 122
Since 1948 federal tax law has granted all married couples the equivalent of community
property treatment of income through the joint return. 123
During recent decades divorce law reform in non-community property states has sought a
similar result in non-enduring marriages. This has been accomplished by treating earnings
and all property acquired by divorcing spouses during their marriage as marital property
subject to equitable division between them. 124 As New York’s highest court explained:
“Equitable distribution was based on the premise that a marriage is, among other
things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as spouse, parent,
wage earner, or homemaker.” … The Equitable Distribution Law reflects an
awareness that the economic success of the partnership depends “not only upon the
respective financial contributions of the partners, but also on a wide range of
nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising
children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the
other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home.” 125
Pensions and other retirement benefits are almost universally included among the marital
assets to be divided between divorcing parties. 126
The 1984 amendments to ERISA known as the “Retirement Equity Act” aligned federal
pension law with this state family law trend. Judicial orders in divorce cases that meet the
act’s terms must be honored by ERISA-qualified pension plans. 127 Similarly, the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, enacted to overturn a decision by
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the Supreme Court holding that federal law prevented state courts from treating military
retirement pay as community or marital property, provides for recognition of the claims of
divorcing military spouses. 128 The pensions of non-military federal employees, whether
accrued under the Federal Employees Retirement System or under the Civil Service
Retirement System, are also subject to division by state courts allocating marital
property. 129
By focusing on the parties’ economic gains during the years of the marriage, this approach
to divorce yields results quite different from Social Security’s. Social Security divorced
spouse benefits are based on the primary earner’s entire earnings record, not just the
portion built up during the marriage. They are also limited to ten-year marriages. States
employing equitable distribution in divorce proceedings apply it to three-year marriages,
five-year marriages, seven-year marriages as well as those lasting ten years and more.
The Social Security programs of Canada, Germany, and Switzerland all provide for
sharing the pension rights of divorcing couples between the parties in proportion to the
years of their marriage. 130

B. The Spouse’s Elective Share of an Estate
The concept of marriage as an economic partnership has also seen expression in estate law
reform. In community property states the surviving spouse’s one-half interest in marital
property is largely secure. 131 In non-community property states where, in general, wills
and title govern property distribution upon death, widows and widowers are nonetheless
usually protected by a statutory right to elect a share of their deceased spouse’s estate,
without regard to the terms of the will. State law reform on this front has taken the form
of expanding the pool of assets to which the elective share applies to include assets
transferred by means other than by will and expanding the spousal share for lengthy
marriages to one-half, while reducing the fraction in shorter marriages so as to
approximate the result in a community property state. 132
With pensions any death benefit for a surviving spouse will depend on elections made
earlier by the pension holder. For that reason, the federal Retirement Equity Act not only
dealt with spousal claims arising out of divorce but also established important
survivorship rights for spouses and former spouses. 133 Unless waived by the
nonemployee spouse, ERISA requires that covered pensions be structured to include a
survivorship annuity in the case of married participants. 134

C. Social Security Essentially Untouched by the Equality Norm Driving
these Reforms
There have been efforts to align Social Security with the marital property idea. They
stretch back forty years or more. Yet the program remains locked onto the premise that
the earnings record of a married worker belongs to the worker alone. In 1979 the
Supreme Court held, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 135 that retirement pensions established
by the Railroad Retirement Act were not subject to division in a community property
jurisdiction’s divorce proceeding. The holding has been understood universally as
applying with equal force to Social Security. 136 Although some state courts have
considered themselves free to consider the prospect of Social Security benefits in dividing
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other marital assets between divorcing parties, a task which can pose challenging
valuation issues, federal preemption bars them from addressing Social Security payments
directly. 137 Either by omission or explicit exclusion Social Security benefits are also
typically left out of the “augmented estate” from which states will calculate a surviving
spouse’s elective share. 138
Shielded by preemption from state marital property reforms, Social Security’s own
provisions for giving spouses a stake in each other’s earnings, including both its treatment
of spousal earnings and the program’s spouse-benefit structure, stand seriously at odds
with the equal shares norm.

D. Ways of Incorporating the Idea of Shared Marital Earnings within
Social Security

1. The Direct Approach
When Congress last addressed a Social Security financing crisis, in 1983, adopting
measures recommended by the Greenspan Commission, it passed on the opportunity to
reshape Social Security along marriage-as-partnership lines. However, it acknowledged
the issue by mandating a study. That year’s amendments directed the Department of
Health and Human Services (then the parent agency for Social Security) to develop
proposals for legislation that would implement the concept of earnings sharing by
combining the “earnings of a husband and wife during the period of their marriage” and
dividing them equally “between them for social security benefit purposes.” 139 Bills
providing for various forms of Social Security earnings sharing as a replacement for
spouse benefits had been introduced in Congress during the 1970s and recommended in
several government reports. 140 The 1983 act directed that the “earnings sharing
implementation report” include analysis of two specific earnings sharing bills and also a
plan set out in a report on providing equal treatment of men and women under Social
Security called for by 1977 legislation. 141
In concept applying earnings sharing to Social Security should be straightforward; the
earnings credits of both spouses would be summed and divided equally between them,
annually as they are built up. This would result in married men and women accumulating
identical wage records throughout their marriages, regardless of respective earnings levels
or whether one spouse devoted substantial or full time to nonmarket, “community” affairs:
cleaning, meal preparation, or child rearing. Two-earner and one-earner couples would
receive equal return on their tax payments into the program. Marital status would be taken
into account from year to year on the contribution side, rather than only at certain critical
points or periods as it is under the current spouse-benefit system. Credits received as
spouse and as worker would cumulate, not offset one another. Credits would also remain
secure through divorce and entry into or exit from the labor force.
Such an approach ought to render spouse benefits in their current form unnecessary.
Instead, each spouse would possess an independent entitlement to old-age and disability
benefits. Periods without paid employment devoted to child rearing, other work in the
home, or education would not leave blank years for Social Security. Half the covered
earnings of an employed spouse would be credited to his or her stay-at-home partner.
Discrepancies between the work patterns of married men and women and their earnings
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levels would, with earnings sharing, balance out. Divorce would not threatened benefits
for they would no longer depend on marital status at benefit time. A divorced or separated
spouse would take from the marriage a wage record reflecting his or her share of its
earnings. Remarriage by divorced or surviving spouses would start a new period of
earnings sharing rather than threaten eligibility.
Because of the bias toward one-earner marriages embodied in the spouse-benefit structure
its replacement with earnings sharing could face political opposition. Straight earnings
sharing would, on average, mean benefit reduction for that currently favored group.
Those urging earnings sharing in the past felt a need to cushion the loss by including
additional credits to couples with different earnings levels in their proposals. 142 In view of
more recent changes in work and family patterns that may no longer be necessary,
particularly following an adequate period of transition.
A change to earnings sharing would, of course, raise countless issues of detail and pose
difficulties of transition. That is true of almost any significant Social Security benefit
revision. But the resulting scheme could be conspicuously fairer than the present dual
system of primary and secondary benefits. If combined with complementary changes in
the primary benefit formula, this reform need not produce a net reduction in Social
Security benefits for women.

2. Issues of Implementation
Implementation of a year-by-year division of earnings between spouses would entail
resolving myriad questions of detail. The report mandated by Congress in 1983 contains a
lengthy inventory. The list includes such matters as whether earnings above the maximum
annual amount for an individual should be split (and presumably taxed), what events
(separation or divorce, disability, retirement) should end earnings sharing for a couple, the
implications for children’s benefits, what to do in the case of couples in which one spouse
has a career of public sector work not covered by Social Security, how marital status
ought to be determined and verified, and many more. 143
In addition, there are issues of whether, and if so how, spouses might coordinate the
benefits paid out of their split accounts. One example is furnished by Alicia Munnell::
Consider the case of a male worker aged sixty-five who wishes to retire but whose
nonworking wife is too young to collect her benefits. With the mandatory division
[of credits], the husband can collect only half the benefits the couple is entitled and
thus may not be able to afford retirement until [his wife is older]. 144
A related puzzle is posed by disability. While earnings sharing could, by yielding an
earnings record for spouses stricken with disability while devoting time to non-market
activities within the home, extend Disability Insurance coverage and improve the benefits
payable to women under such circumstances, 145 that very shift would, without more,
threaten a reduction in the benefit level available when the higher-earning spouse becomes
disabled.
Taken individually issues like these are hardly insurmountable. 146 To deal with the first
situation, for example, Congress could lower the age of eligibility for a younger, lowearnings spouse (with suitable actuarial reduction). A couple could also be given an
option to reallocate some of the credits accrued during their marriage back to the older or
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disabled spouse. Other workable solutions are possible. 147 Collectively, however, these
issues appear to have dampened any Agency enthusiasm for a switch to earnings sharing.
After carefully reviewing the costs, political challenges, administrative burdens, and
transition issues posed by Social Security reform along these lines, the 1985 report back to
Congress made no recommendation.
Conversion to earnings sharing would, without question, require coordinated changes in
many features of the Social Security benefits system, extending to its benefit provisions
for children. It would, in fact, force redesign of the entire system. The need for such
drastic change is not, by itself, adequate ground for rejecting an approach that promises
fairer recognition of both earnings and marriage and a reduction in the inequity of
privileging one-earner couples at the expense of others. That, of course, assumes that,
notwithstanding the difficulties, a transition from the present worker/spouse dual-benefit
approach to earnings sharing is administratively and politically feasible and that no
simpler alternatives are available.

3. More Limited Earnings Sharing Variants Focused on Divorce and
Retirement
A. Retrospective Earnings Sharing in the Event of Divorce
A simpler variant on the year-by-year earnings sharing approach would limit the
combination and division of earnings credits to divorcing couples. This could take the
form of subjecting either Social Security earnings records or future benefits to division
under state divorce law, by allowing state courts and negotiated divorce settlements to
reallocate the parties’ covered earnings or the resulting benefits. Alternatively, Congress
could rework the program to internalize the marital-property concept, providing for the
automatic pooling and division of a couple’s marital earnings upon notice of their divorce.
Either approach would align the program with current legal and social trends, 148 while
avoiding many of the implementation challenges of annual earnings sharing.
Importantly, this more limited approach would not require the Social Security
Administration to keep track of the marital status of all covered earners. Instead, the
burden of presenting evidence supporting the division of a couple’s Social Security
earnings records could rest on the benefitted divorcing party, endorsed perhaps by a state
court. Since 1978 Canada has had such a scheme in place for its social security system. 149
Originally, an option limited to divorcing parties, Canada’s “credit splitting” provisions
were amended in 1987 to extend to separating spouses and “common law” partners. It is
now available as a matter of right unless waived through an agreement signed by both
parties. 150

B. Waiting to the Time of Eligibility to Divide Primary Benefits or Earnings
between Spouses
The Federal Employee Retirement System provides survivors’ benefits to the spouses of
all covered employees who are married at the time of retirement. Unlike Social Security
secondary benefits this feature is not costless to the retiree. A survivor’s benefit equal to
50% of the retiree’s payment results in a 10% reduction in the retiree’s amount. 151 This
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survivor’s benefit can be waived or reduced but only with the consent of the nonemployee spouse. A similar framework, with different parameters, applies to retirement
benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System. 152 In like fashion ERISA requires
private pension plans to provide a joint and survivor annuity in the case of married
individuals, unless waived by the non-employee spouse. Under such qualified joint and
survivor annuities, the size of the reduction during the period both members of the couple
are alive compensating for the ongoing payment to the survivor is a function of their
respective ages. 153
Adapting such an approach to Social Security retirement benefits would require creating
one or more joint and survivor payment plans for those who are married at the point either
of the pair applies for retirement benefits. Actuarial adjustments based on the spouses’
respective ages could hold the value of this benefit package or set of options equal to that
of two single individual’s retirement benefits. 154 Taking benefits in this form would
presumably be mandatory unless waived by both spouses.

C. Combining a Surviving Spouse Benefit with Year-by-Year Earnings
Sharing?
A cost-neutral, joint and survivors benefit for couples still married at benefit time could
also be attached to year-by-year earnings sharing. The rationale for such an addition rests
on the premise that a surviving spouse needs more than one half the income on which the
couple was previously living. For that reason and because of the typical earnings, wealth,
age, and life expectancy differential between husbands and wives, the inadequacy of
earning sharing alone as a solution to the income needs of widows seems to have become
accepted. Both plans modeled in the 1985 Health and Human Services study provided for
“inheritance” of the portion of the earnings record of a deceased spouse compiled during
the years of the marriage. 155
Under the current dual benefit system, spouses with essentially equal earnings records
receive their respective retired-worker benefits during years of shared retirement while a
one-earner couple with the same total annual covered earnings receives more, the sum of
one full primary benefit and a spouse benefit equal to an additional 50%. Death reduces
the one-earner couple’s total Social Security by one-third (dropping the sum from 150%
of the primary benefit to 100%) while it cuts the two-earner couple’s monthly amount in
half. (Because of the primary benefit offset, that same individual benefit level, one-half
the couple’s prior total, continues for the survivor without any widow(er) augmentation.)
A straightforward application of earnings sharing produces the latter result in the case of
both one- and two-earner marriages that endure. For marriages occurring later in life that
bring together individuals with very different Social Security records earnings sharing
would pose the risk of an even more dramatic decline in benefits for the survivor. Even
with inheritance of earnings from the period of the marriage, this would be the case if the
high earner spouse were to be the first to die.
A system that gave each spouse the right to have the other’s retirement benefit taken in the
form of an actuarially equivalent joint and survivor annuity could assure the surviving
spouse of a benefit greater than 50% of the benefits paid during the couple’s joint lives
without placing the burden of funding this assurance on others as the current widow(er)
benefit structure does.
20

4. Administrative Challenges
Surveying the challenges entailed in administering a year-by-year earnings sharing system
in 1985, the Agency stressed the difficulty it would face in determining and verifying
marital status on an ongoing basis. (It estimated that over 90% of those sixty-two and over
will have been married at some point, nearly half of them more than once.). The Social
Security Administration emphasized the incapacity of its existing data systems and
procedures to handle so different a method of tracking earnings and calculating
benefits. 156 The report left little doubt that these were not challenges the Agency was
eager to take on and that if they had to be undertaken the conversion would require
substantial lead time and funding:
Once the details of an earnings sharing plan [became] known, it would take SSA at
least 5 years to develop [an automated system to pay claims based on it]. It should
be noted, however, that even if a large percentage of the workload were automated
prior to implementation of earnings sharing, the number of cases remaining to be
processed manually would still constitute a significant workload. Moreover,
because of the added complexity, time needed to process earnings sharing benefits
would be considerably greater than the time that is needed under present law. 157
Converting to even one of the more limited earnings sharing variants would not remove
the need for the Agency, on occasion, to resolve difficult questions of fact and law bearing
on whether two persons are “validly married”. Constructed carefully, however, an
earnings sharing approach could drastically reduce the importance of such questions. The
current Social Security system puts so much stress on these issues because of the large
stakes – eligibility for spouse benefits – riding on the answer. In contrast, when
determining eligibility to file a joint return, the Internal Revenue Service relies largely on
the parties’ own declaration of status. 158 Tying the Social Security treatment of a couple’s
earnings to their federal income tax return status, would not be a bad solution. That
approach would be particularly attractive if the marital status on which any year’s sharing
of earnings rests were, after a short period, to enjoy a strong statutory presumption of
validity. 159

5. Implications for Mother/Father and Child Benefits
Social Security’s current spouse-benefit structure not only extends benefits to senior
widows and widowers, it also provides mother and father benefits to younger surviving
spouses and former spouses caring for children of a deceased earner, children who are
themselves eligible for survivors’ benefits. When the Act’s earlier failure to provide such
benefits for men was addressed by the Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 160 the
majority quite sensibly viewed this category of spouse benefits as more focused on the
welfare of children than on the needs of the surviving spouse to whom they are paid. This
led the Court to its conclusion that:
Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home to care for a
child, the gender-based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely irrational. The
classification discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex
of the surviving parent. 161
As is true of most other components of the spouse-benefit complex, the purposes
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underlying mother and father benefits are, in truth, blurred. Unlike the benefits paid
directly to the children these end upon a surviving spouse’s remarriage and are reduced or
blocked if the survivor has significant earned income. On the other hand, concern with
the surviving children results in this being the one situation in which a divorced former
spouse need not have spent ten years in the marriage to be eligible. Still, a qualifying
marriage is a prerequisite; parentage is not enough. And other caretaking relatives,
grandparents, say, taking care of the children of a deceased son or daughter, do not
qualify.
Were earnings sharing adopted in some form with a surviving spouse’s benefit attached,
surviving children might be better served by a slight increase in their own benefit amounts
than by the re-grafting some form of mother and father benefits onto this altered structure.

6. Implications for the Treatment of “Excess Earnings”
Except in the case of a spouse divorced for two years or more, spouse benefits are reduced
in the event the primary beneficiary has substantial earnings. Not only does eligibility
depend on the primary beneficiary’s application for retirement benefits but the amount is
affected by “excess earnings” of the primary beneficiary spouse. Presumably, with
earnings sharing, the retirement benefit applications and excess earnings of one spouse
would not affect the other’s benefit eligibility or amount. As a consequence, a spouse
with low or no earnings could commence benefits well ahead of the retirement of the
couple’s principal earner, albeit at an actuarially reduced amount. In cases where the two
no longer coordinate financial decision-making or comprise a household this would be an
improvement over the status quo.

VI. The Challenge of Transition
Nearly all of the revisions of spouse benefits explored here would require significant
changes in the Social Security Administration’s procedures and data systems and, as a
consequence, delayed implementation. Following an adequate period for the necessary
administrative changes, however, many of them could be applied without further delay.
Plans proposing significant changes in the terms governing primary benefits for retirees
routinely exempt all current beneficiaries and those within a decade or so of eligibility.
Sensitivity to the expectations of prospective spouse benefit recipients need not be so
sweeping. Assuming implementation is delayed several years so as to give the Social
Security Administration time to prepare, there is no reason at that point not to begin
applying earnings sharing and new survivorship options to all future marriages.
Unacceptable as it would be to reduce the Social Security retirement benefit formula for
individuals in their sixties, changing the Social Security consequences of future marriages
by members of that same age cohort, let alone younger ones, seems altogether different.
Similarly, assuming an effective date five years or more beyond enactment, applying an
earnings sharing regime instead of current law to all subsequent divorces, without regard
to the age of the parties or duration of the marriage, would appear to run little risk of
upsetting firm retirement income plans or other settled expectations.
How to phase in replacement of spouse benefits for individuals currently married who
remain in those marriages until reaching the age of Social Security eligibility poses a far
more difficult question. Current Social Security recipients should, of course, be left under
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the existing structure. This ought to include those currently receiving no spouse benefit
due to the level of their own primary benefit but for whom benefits as a widow or
widower are in prospect should they outlive their current partner. At the opposite
extreme, married individuals toward the beginning of their working years can, quite
reasonably, be brought under any replacement regime. Change to year-by-year earnings
sharing, coupled with an actuarially sound joint and survivor payout option, should
probably not be forced on married individuals a decade or less from Social Security’s age
of eligibility. For most younger persons, however, the ultimate effect of substitution
should be sufficiently speculative to undercut any argument that change disturbs settled
long-range income plans.
Other measures curbing the inequity built into the current spouse-benefit system might be
applied during a phase out period. For example, in the case of married individuals 55 and
younger spouse benefits could be capped. Rather than scaling as a percentage of the
primary benefit all the way to the maximum amount, spouse benefits could be limited so
that those married to the highest earners would receive no more than the spouses of
average earners.
A key factor in determining the pace at which the present spouse benefits provisions can
be replaced for future beneficiaries is the extent to which spouse benefit changes are
accompanied by complementary program revisions that improve primary benefits for
women.

VII. Complementing Spouse Benefit Reform with Other Program
Adjustments that Would More Equitably Improve Retirement
Income Security for Women
While replacing spouse benefits with earnings sharing in some form combined with an
actuarially sound joint and survivor payout for spouses would yield a fairer system – in
relation to the never married, those in marriages in which spouses have comparable
earnings, and individuals divorced after fewer than 10 years – the cumulative effect on
women would be negative. To be acceptable, therefore, any replacement of spouse
benefits would require offsetting adjustments in the method of calculating retired-worker
benefits, adjustments that respond to the factors that hold down benefit levels for women,
especially women at the bottom of the scale. More than 40% of female Social Security
retired worker beneficiaries receive amounts that are below a poverty-level income. 162
The figure for men is 17%. 163 Women make up over two-thirds of the Supplemental
Security Income recipients sixty-five and over. 164 Without changes in how Social
Security’s retired-worker benefits are calculated, spouse benefit reform would increase the
gender poverty gap among seniors.
Retired-worker benefits depend on average earnings during periods of covered
employment. Although wage parity between men and women may lie ahead, in the near
future women as a group will continue to receive lower Social Security retired-worker
benefits because of lower past wages. 165 There is partial mitigation in the system’s
“tilt” 166 – lower wage employees receive a better return in Social Security benefits than
higher wage employees – but not enough to offset the wage disparity. Since more men
than women earn above the taxable wage base for Social Security, raising that cap, a
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component of several long-term solvency plans, would, standing alone, increase the
gender differential. 167
The treatment of years spent out of covered employment or in part-time work also affects
the benefits retired women receive from Social Security. Historically the work lives of
women have – in comparison with those of men – incorporated significant periods spent
in the home caring for children. Women are far more likely than men to be single parents,
forced to make compromises on the amount and nature of their work and bearing costs
that reduce the ability to save. 168 The retired-worker benefit formula rests on thirty-five
years of average indexed earnings. 169 Reducing that number generally or ignoring years
of work at home or while caring for children or other relatives would yield higher retiredworker benefits for many women. 170 A step beyond ignoring such years would credit
them in some fashion toward eventual benefits-in old age or disability. A few have
proposed, in this vein, that a constructive wage for Social Security purposes be attached to
child-rearing, elder care, or work in the home more generally. 171 Serious practical
problems and theoretical objections surround such an approach.
As an alternative to the standard benefit formula Social Security contains a Special
Minimum Benefit designed for steadily employed low earnings workers. 172 While it has
withered away to insignificance, 173 if revived and enhanced it could improve the lot of
senior women, particularly if, as some have proposed, the amount of earnings necessary
for a year of credit were reduced and years spent in child-rearing and the like were
counted. 174
Finally, women’s greater average longevity and more limited retirement income resources
suggest another form of benefit adjustment that has begun to appear in Social Security
reform proposals – benefit amount increases for recipients who live past certain
benchmark ages. 175
Finally, the Social Security backstop available to those with grossly inadequate benefits
and the ineligible is the federal need-tested program for seniors, Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). Over half of all SSI recipients eligible on the basis of age also receive
Social Security benefits. 176 With the exception of the annual cost-of-living adjustment,
SSI benefits are reduced dollar-for-dollar for increases in a recipient’s Social Security
beyond an initial $20 exclusion. This amount that has remained unchanged since the
program was adopted forty years ago. Because of how these programs interact
improvement in Social Security’s Special Minimum Benefit and related reforms focused
on those with low life-time earnings will have little or no net impact on many of those
most in need unless corresponding changes are made to SSI. 177

Conclusion
Spouse benefits responded quite reasonably to the mores as well as the practical realities
of another era. During Social Security’s early years they succeeded in fulfilling the
purpose that led Congress to append them to the system in 1939, without serious inequity
to contributors and recipients or waste to the system. In recent decades, however,
dramatic social, economic and legal changes have altered the profile of the American
family, at home and at work. Since 1939, the Social Security system itself has grown and
changed enormously. In today’s environment, the dual system – primary benefits based
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on the worker’s prior employment set off against secondary benefits based on a present or
past marriage to a covered worker – functions awkwardly and unfairly. Its allocation of
non-contributory spouse benefits seems quite arbitrary, and the tax burden associated with
those benefits weighs heavily on the large and growing portion of the work force that
receives no benefit from them. The system’s failure to produce benefits for women
comparable to those it yields for men can no longer be lightly dismissed. If it is to
respond adequately to these developments, Congress will have to revise the Social
Security benefit scheme substantially, not only the spouse-benefit provisions but those
governing primary benefits.
That will require more attention and political will than these issues have received in over a
decade. Beginning in the mid-1990s proponents of various forms of “privatization”
focused the Social Security policy debate. 178 By definition, privatizing, however
packaged, amounted to converting Social Security at least in part from a defined benefit
into a defined contribution plan, thereby threatening its progressive benefit formula and all
features like spouse benefits that do not map directly onto an individual’s past covered and
taxed employment. The resulting political debate pushed those concerned about benefit
adequacy for and equity among older women onto the defensive. While groups with such
concerns had once been critics of Social Security’s spouse-benefit structure, during the
late 1990s and throughout the Presidency of George H.W. Bush they became its defenders
and even advocates for liberalizing marriage-based benefits. 179 More recently, fear of
Social Security’s being trimmed as part of some “grand bargain” on federal debt reduction
has had a similar effect. Given the importance of Social Security to women, nearly all the
measures discussed as plausible ways of reducing Social Security’s long-term
expenditures threaten a disproportionate impact on older women. They have, for that
reason, quite consistently drawn opposition from women’s advocacy groups. 180
If Social Security’s long-term fiscal imbalance is addressed with a tweak here and a tuck
there without attention to such outdated features as the spouse-benefit provisions and how
the primary benefit formula fits the work lives and family commitments of women, the
nation will have missed a rare opportunity to improve the fairness and adequacy of the
program’s benefits. Carefully done such comprehensive reform could be part of rather
than at odds with bringing the program’s long-term costs and revenues into balance.
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